New Bodies in the Dolphin Encounter by Curry-Castillo, James
James Curry-Castillo  
 
New Bodies in the Dolphin Encounter 
 
 
This article examines the recent media coverage and scientific work on the field of dolphin communication, 
specifically of the work of Dr. Denise Herzing and the Wild Dolphin Foundation, and analyzes the interaction 
between human and dolphin in the biotechnical search for language translation.  
 
 
Preface. 
 
 This essay was written as the final paper for Courtney Handman’s course “Translation and 
the Boundaries of Difference,” which I took during my junior year as an anthropology major at 
Reed College, in 2015. The essay responds directly to some of the reportage of what was, at the 
time, an extremely recent development in the scientific study of dolphin communication. This 
paper was my first foray into what would later become the topic of my senior thesis. 
 
 
 
Introduction : the Dolphin Event. 
 
 
 We are apparently in the middle of an 
important moment for dolphin communication. 
Today, on the cover of the most recent issue of 
National Geographic, is the image of a bottlenose 
dolphin swimming towards the reader, with what 
looks like a crooked smile on its face (figure 1). The 
title: “Thinking Like A Dolphin: Understanding 
One of the Smartest Creatures on Earth”. Elsewhere, 
a series of headlines sensationally point towards the 
same event: “Dolphin whistle instantly translated by 
computer,” “Dolphin whistle translated by computer 
for the first time—and it said SEAWEED,” “Did that 
Figure 1: Cover of the May 2015 issue of  
National Geographic. 
dolphin just say seaweed?”, “Did a Dolphin Really Say ‘Sargassum’?” (New Scientist, The Daily Mail, 
The Washington Post, and Discovery News). 
What has occurred? By most accounts it may seem as if humans have miraculously begun 
contact with an extremely radical Other, which Joshua Foer, the author of the National Geographic 
article, describes as “a kind of alien intelligence sharing our planet,” a being who “may be the 
closest we’ll come to encountering ET” (51). But taken at face value, this narrative is somewhat 
impossible to believe. Of the headlines I listed, the final one speaks to such unbelievability, 
expressing skepticism. It asks: did a dolphin really speak? 
The aim of this essay is not to answer this question, but rather to explore a pair of parallel 
concerns: 1) What, exactly, has just occurred in the field of dolphin communication? and 2) What 
sort of labor had to be done to make such an event possible? These two questions must be 
answered together if we are to make sense of what has happened, because the event is not legible 
without an attention both the theoretical and material assemblages that have allowed it to emerge. 
In order to limit my scope, I will focus specifically on the use of the Cetacean Hearing and 
Telemetry machine (CHAT), which the dolphin communication scientist Denise Herzing describes 
specifically as not a “translator” but rather a “human/dolphin interface or acoustic keyboard” 
(Wild Dolphin Project 2015). In particular this paper will explore the ways in which the CHAT 
figures language as a technology, as well as the ways such a figuration may affect the nature of 
translation and of communication itself. 
 
The C.H.A.T. Interface. 
On March 31, 2014, Dr. Denise Herzing published a blog post to the Wild Dolphin 
Project website titled CHAT: Is It A Dolphin Translator Or An Interface? Throughout the post she 
explains the workings of the technology being used to establish communication with wild spotted 
dolphins. The basic description reads: 
CHAT (Cetacean Hearing and Telemetry) is an underwater computer designed by Dr. Thad Starner 
and his team at Georgia Tech.  CHAT receives sounds via two hydrophones, and produces sounds 
through an underwater speaker.  The Wild Dolphin Project, under the direction of Dr. Denise Herzing 
and with the help of colleagues Dr. Adam Pack and Dr. Fabienne Delfour, created a few basic artificial 
sounds, specifically whistles (outside of the dolphins’ natural repertoire) to label a few play objects 
(Sargassum – a natural play toy, scarf, and rope – toys that humans bring in the water) (Wild Dolphin 
Project 2015). 
 
When news outlets claim that a dolphin said the word “sargassum,” they are not referring 
to an event in which humans translated a term that was indigenous to the dolphin. What actually 
occurred: 
As it happened in August I was in the water when I heard the “word” sargassum in my bone-
conducting headphone, meaning essentially that the computer system heard and recognized the 
incoming whistle for sargassum and was triggered to say the word “sargassum” in my ear (Wild Dolphin 
Project). 
 
Herzing puts quotes around “word” because the signal that the CHAT registered was in fact 
a dolphin whistle mimicking a sound designed by the scientists meant to refer to the object of 
“sargassum.” The scientists are fairly certain that a dolphin indeed vocalized this sound, but 
Herzing is quick to add: 
...this is not to say that a dolphin knew what it was saying when it put out this whistle. It may simply 
be that the dolphin was mimicking this whistle or that the computer heard a close approximation to 
“sargassum” and triggered (Wild Dolphin Project). 
 
 The problem of whether or not the dolphin “knew what it was saying” is an important one, 
and one I will explore more directly soon; for now, suffice it to say that this problem highlights 
the way in which dolphin research is largely concerned with the subjective interiority—or, in 
strictly scientific terms, the “cognition”—of dolphins. 
Despite the caveats just listed, Herzing reports that the event “was both exciting and 
confirmatory” (Wild Dolphin Project 2015). Herzing concludes by pointing towards the 
direction future experiments could take: 
Through the summer we had other whistles that “sounded” by ear that they were mimics but did not 
trigger the computer for a match. But as we reviewed the data this winter, it appeared that many 
whistles did look like mimics but were placed, by the dolphins, in a higher frequency range, one that 
the system was not designed to hear (dolphins have been known to jump octaves or adjust for 
background noise). So, as we approach the summer of 2015 our priority is to increase “our” hearing 
range via the computer, and spend more time in the water exposing the dolphins to a few of these 
signals and see what they might do (Wild Dolphin Project). 
 
 Important here is the fact of sound frequency, a material characteristic of the dolphin 
whistle that requires an adjustment of the communication apparatus. Some labor must now be 
mobilized to make the CHAT capable of the basic task of being able to register these higher 
frequency dolphin whistles as audible sounds. 
 
Prosthesis. 
The CHAT functions as a prosthesis, extending the capabilities of both dolphin and 
human bodies beyond their limits. Prostheses are commonly understood to be devices that in one 
way or another replace something that is missing. What the CHAT replaces in both the human 
and the dolphin is double: 1) the organ for communication with the other (human mouths cannot 
produce dolphin sounds, and vice versa, so the CHAT performs both of these functions), and 2) a 
common language between dolphins and humans. 
 As the use of a prosthesis, the use of the CHAT leads to the emergence of an assemblage 
we can describe as a new cyborg. This new cyborg that emerges from the assemblage of humans and 
the CHAT machine is quite similar to the “submarine cyborg” that the anthropologist Stefan 
Helmreich describes in his ethnographic study of the Alvin, a three-person submersible operated by 
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Both this submarine and the CHAT translate sound 
from the water for typically land-dwelling human ears. This translation is in both cases one that 
not only transforms a sound into another sound—the submarine creating “echoing sounds” from 
transponder signals (Helmreich 2007: 625), the CHAT creating English speech from dolphin 
whistles—but that, in so doing, transforms an unintelligible signal into a meaningful sign. As 
Helmreich writes, the body that uses such a machine is “threaded into a media ecology of 
communication and control, networked into a semiotic order that extends, modulates, and 
conditions [its] senses” (622). The human body is here experiencing two transformations: the first, 
a conceptual transformation of the body into a semiotic system; and second, an extension of the 
boundaries of this semiotic system. This means that the body, as a system that senses phenomena and 
then interprets meaning, has extended itself to include a new technology (e.g. the submarine, the 
CHAT) within its boundaries. 
It is not only the human that here becomes a new cyborg, but the dolphin as well. By 
interfacing with the CHAT, the dolphin undergoes the process of incorporating a foreign 
prosthesis and thus changing into a different biotechnical entity. Such a claim is only possible if we 
accept John Weightman’s idea that language itself is a prosthesis:  
Language is peculiar in that it functions as if it were an inborn part of the body. Although it came to us 
originally from without, it is experienced as being inherent, just as the owner of a well-fitting set of dentures 
may chomp happily away, completely forgetting that his teeth are not his own. How many of us, when 
talking, remember that the words we are uttering are not our personal property? For this reason, I would 
suggest as a preliminary definition: language is a necessary and unique collective prosthesis (Weightman 55). 
 
 The foreign prosthesis that the dolphin incorporates is then that of the common dolphin-
human language fabricated by the scientists of the Wild Dolphin Project. The idea here is that if 
the dolphin understood what it was “saying” when it made the whistle for “sargassum”—a 
word/sound developed by the scientists—then it has taken a small step towards developing a new 
interiority, one defined in terms of communication with the human other. 
 The possibility that dolphins may end up speaking a language developed by humans raises 
questions about the relationship that may thus become established between dolphins and humans. 
The politics of such an outcome are complicated, and necessarily so, since as Donna Haraway 
argues, among the relations between companion species there is “no easy unity to be found” 
(Haraway 2008: 41). But is the relationship between dolphins and humans one of companionship? 
Or is it threatening to become one of colonization? Is the linguistic prosthesis here introduced by 
the scientists one that refashions the subjectivity of dolphins to be more like that of humans? Or 
does the human become more dolphin-like as well? 
The significance of Weightman’s argument is the idea that language is always a prosthesis, 
and that by their use of language, subjects are always manipulating and being manipulated by a 
technology that is both interior and foreign to them. So it is not that the CHAT creates cyborgs 
where there were previously purely natural biological entities, but rather precisely that it creates 
new cyborgs different from the cyborgs that came before. Remaining agnostic regarding the 
existence of an indigenous dolphin language, I argue that humans are always already cyborgs at least 
insofar as they are linguistic subjects. The same may hold true for dolphins, and this formulation 
of course focuses on the relationship between the technology of language and an embodied 
subjectivity, saying nothing of the effects any other technologies, tools, or objects may have on the 
cultivation of a human or a dolphin subject. 
The cyborg ontology is one that raises questions about one’s provenance and belonging. 
What am I? I am a cyborg, one of Donna Haraway’s “chimeras,” those “theorized and fabricated 
hybrids of machine and organism” (Haraway 2008). Where did these mechanical and organic 
components of my being originate from? They did not originate from myself, that much is sure. 
But if I originated from others, do I belong to them as well? Donna Haraway’s cyborg is not so 
submissive: 
The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and 
patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly 
unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential (ibid). 
 
Haraway is here speaking specifically in the political context of Socialist-Feminism, but the words 
resonate within any of the various political relations that exist between the technological, the 
social, and the ontological. It may be the case that I originate from others, but this still leaves open 
the question of whether or not those others remain dominant over me. 
The question is just as open for the relationship between humans and dolphins. What is at 
stake here is not simply the translation of signs into other signs but rather the transformation of 
subjectivities into other subjectivities. The question still remains, however: who is being 
transformed into what? The answer is hardly ever clear when it is about a translation between 
human languages. The question becomes even more complicated when dolphins enter the mix. In 
this paper, I seek to better demonstrate the shape of the question by exploring some of the 
valences of the rhetoric surrounding the project to communicate with dolphins. 
 
Other Worlds. 
Prominently displayed on the front page of the website for the Wild Dolphin Project is the 
following slogan: 
 
Figure 2: Slogan from wilddolphinproject.org, accessed May 2015. 
 
 What a provocative phrase! Its meaning is not immediately explicated on the page, but as 
one pokes around the website one begins to get a sense at what is being said. On the “Mission and 
Vision” page of the website, we find the following list in a section titled “Strategies and 
Principles”: 
•  Non-invasive research builds a trust between the research team and dolphin pod, which allows 
data to be captured in the most natural setting. 
• Underwater observation provides an inclusive approach to analyze behavior, genetics, associations, 
cognition, and geography; along with, a reliable photo-identification tracking system. 
• Preserving the natural environment gives long-term viability to all life-forms. 
• Education provides a tool in which all can make informed decisions and appropriate actions. 
• “IN THEIR WORLD, ON THEIR TERMS” 
 Certain terms and phrases stand out here: trust, the most natural setting, behavior, cognition, 
all life-forms, and of course, “IN THEIR WORLD, ON THEIR TERMS.” 
 
 What all these words point to is a focus on the interiority of dolphins and an attention to 
the possible differences and similarities this interiority may have with that of humans. In the 2015 
National Geographic article, Joshua Foer writes that dolphin scientists “are more interested in how 
the dolphins think than in what they can do” (35). It is perhaps intuitive yet still noteworthy that a 
scientific project about communication ends up also being largely about interiority. John Durham 
Peters notes, in his history of the idea of communication: 
Although speech, as Aristotle thought, is perhaps a capacity distinct to the human species, ‘communication’ 
is not…Communication is something we share with animals and computers…. (Peters 1999: 227). 
 
This is to say that a study on communication, particularly on communication with and between 
non-humans, does not necessarily have to posit any theory about the interiority of those non- 
humans. Still, this study does posit such a theory. Why? 
One commonly repeated factoid about dolphins is that they are among the most intelligent 
species on the planet. This is the main reason given as to why dolphins may have a complex 
interiority at all. The exact form of this interiority, however, remains mysterious. As Foer writes: 
...what is intelligence really? When pressed, we often have to admit that we’re measuring how similar a 
species is to us. [Comparative psychologist Stan Kucjaz] thinks that’s a mistake. “The question is not how 
smart are dolphins, but how are dolphins smart? 
 Thus the task of understanding this non-human other is figured in terms of difference 
from—and as such in terms of a comparison to—a human subjectivity.  
 This difference is understood by scientists mostly through a study of the body of the 
dolphin. The article in National Geographic includes a foldout that richly visualizes the sensory 
apparatuses of dolphins and humans, complete with illustrated X-rays of dolphin and human 
heads and the organs inside of them. In the image for the human brain, an arrow points into the 
ear. Out of the ear radiate circles of dashed lines mean to represent sound waves that are then 
perceived by the human ear as well as the auditory nerve that attaches this ear to the brain. 
The dolphin image is a bit more complex; rather than a single arrow entering the dolphin 
head, there are two, one going in and one going out. Already a fundamental difference between 
the auditory senses of human hearing and dolphin echolocation is legible. The illustration of the 
latter begins with arrows coming out of a fatty tissue in the dolphin head called the “melon” which 
the dolphin uses to beam the sound of clicks it produces in structures called “phonic lips.” This 
sound is illustrated to radiate outward in an arrow labeled “Focused amplified sound,” which 
bounces off of a fish. From the surface of this fish a second arrow labeled “Echo returns” flies back 
to the dolphin, entering the auditory nerve, which attaches to the dolphin brain. 
For all the difference that is here figured, however, a fundamental similarity between 
humans and dolphins is demonstrated, and that is the possession of a brain. Indeed, the opposite 
page, titled “A Mind of Their Own,” presents the following passage: 
Since the ancestors of dolphins left their fellow mammals behind and entered the water more than 50 
million years ago, humans and dolphins have evolved radically different bodies adapted to wholly separate 
environments. But we share one notable piece of anatomy—a large, complicated brain. Among the 
challenges to our own big brains: penetrating the mystery of how dolphins use theirs (National Geographic 
2015). 
 
 This figuration of the difference and similarity between humans and dolphins is resonant 
with the cosmology described by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro in his essay about Amerindian 
perspectivism and perspectival anthropology: 
 
This cosmology imagines a universe peopled by different types of subjective agencies, human as well as 
nonhuman, each endowed with the same generic type of soul, that is, the same set of cognitive and volitional capacities. 
The possession of a similar soul implies the possession of similar concepts, which determine that all subjects 
see things in the same way. … What changes when passing from one species of subject to another is the 
‘objective correlative,’ the referent of these concepts: what jaguars see as ‘manioc beer’ (the proper drink of 
people, jaguar-type or otherwise), humans see as ‘blood.” … Such difference of perspective—not a plurality of views 
of a single world, but a single view of different worlds—cannot derive from the soul, since the latter is the common original 
ground of being. Rather, such difference is located in the bodily differences between species, for the body and its 
affections (in Spinoza’s sense, the body’s capacities to affect and be affected by other bodies) is the site and 
instrument of ontological differentiation and referential disjunction (2005: 6, italics mine). 
 
 The phrases I highlighted are particularly striking in their resonance with dolphin research. 
For scientists, the “same set of cognitive and volitional capacities” is referred to not as the soul but 
as the brain. Dolphin and human brains are indeed thought to be generically the same, 
differentiated from that of humans in terms of the way it is affected by the entirety of the animal’s 
embodiment. Dolphin research is also surprisingly similar to Amerindian perspectivism in the way 
it posits the existence of multiple worlds. This is a strange move for a natural science to take, 
which typically works on the assumption of a single continuous Nature within which all 
phenomena exist. Dolphin research does not really contradict this assumption; it does, however, 
make room in this Nature for multiple worlds, and it does so in a rather extreme and 
straightforward manner. When speaking of dolphins and humans, we are speaking of two species 
that literally inhabit two radically different environments: one lives in the ocean, and the other 
one lives on the land. The bodies of the two species are figured as mediations of their worlds, 
shaped by those worlds via evolution and expressive of those worlds by their “capacities to affect 
and be affected.” Ultimately, the point is not that the dolphin scientists subscribe to the same 
cosmology as Amerindian Perspectivists, but that their approach to communication is based on 
similar theoretical grounds. 
These theoretical grounds are ones that emphasize the role of embodiment and affect in 
communication. In theory, the scientists are attempting to understand the dolphins on “their 
terms.” In practice, this means transforming the affective capacities of both human and dolphin 
bodies through the intervention of a pair of prostheses, the CHAT machine and the common 
language between humans and dolphins. In transforming their affective capacities, the dolphin 
scientists are in a real sense attempting to create new bodies. In trying to create new bodies, they are 
also trying to create a new world, one shared by humans and dolphins as speaking subjects. 
 
Conclusion. 
In this essay I have left out a lot of relevant information that could help to make sense of 
scientists’ recent encounters with dolphins. In particular, I have neglected to expose the historical 
roots that both dolphin research and cyborg theories share in the world of cybernetics (particularly 
in the figures of Gregory Bateson, Donna Haraway, and Norbert Weiner). I have also neglected to 
embed this moment in a larger history of communication itself, which extends past the modern 
era into antiquity. 
 I believe such historical contextualization would be useful for the study of this moment 
because it helps to de-sensationalize what otherwise seems entirely like an extreme rupture with the 
past. This is not to say that there is nothing new about what is happening. Surely the emergence of 
a common language between humans and dolphins would be a revolutionary development, but if 
such an even occurs, it will have been in large part because of a long intellectual and political 
history that existed prior to the work of the scientists in the Wild Dolphin Project. What I hope I 
have achieved in this paper is to have emphasized the peculiar ontologies that both motivate and 
emerge from the biotechnical labor done in the contemporary field of dolphin communication. 
These ontologies are new, but not radically so. Indeed, what is occurring in the field of dolphin 
communication is new, but it has its precedents.
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